題目：The (In)Visibility of Political Connections

報(bào)告人：巴黎高等商學(xué)院會(huì)計(jì)及管理控制系 Wu Han 助理教授

時(shí)間：2021年3月31日（周三） 9:00-12:00

地點(diǎn)：bwin必贏唯一官網(wǎng)313室

歡迎各位老師和同學(xué)屆時(shí)積極參加！

報(bào)告摘要：

We study the extent to which market participants are informed about firms’ political connections when the connections are not publicly disclosed and how it affects pricing efficiency. Using a sample of public announcements of government officials’ corruption investigations, we find that, on average, investors do not realize that officials under investigation are connected to firms in which they have invested and that the value of those connections has been lost. This finding suggests that the connections generally are of low visibility to investors. However, institutional investors know about at least some of the connections and abnormally sell their shares in the firms when investigations are announced. The loss of value of the connections is not fully incorporated into stock prices until the connections are subsequently disclosed, and price incorporation is slower for the connections that have been less visible to institutional investors. Our results suggest that lack of visibility significantly harms pricing efficiency of political connections.

報(bào)告嘉賓簡(jiǎn)介：

Wu Han，巴黎高等商學(xué)院會(huì)計(jì)及管理控制系助理教授，他在2016年于挪威經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院獲得會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)博士學(xué)位，目前已在國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)頂級(jí)期刊Review of Accounting Studies與國(guó)際管理學(xué)頂級(jí)期刊(UTD24)Management Science發(fā)表多篇學(xué)術(shù)論文，同時(shí)還擔(dān)任國(guó)際知名會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)期刊Contemporary Accounting Research、European Accounting Review以及Accounting and Business Research的匿名審稿人。他的主要研究方向?yàn)楣局卫怼?/span>